Admiral's Cup 1981

This article features a selection of photos from the 1981 Admiral's Cup from Guy Gurney and Phil Uhl, as well as a recently published video of the series (by retro yachting) as narrated by the late Bob Fisher. The series was won by Britain, with the USA second and Germany third, although the subsequent controversy over the rating of British yacht Victory of Burnham was considered by many to place something of a cloud over that result.

Part of the 1981 Admiral's Cup fleet Dusselboot, Intuition, Bribon III, Wee Willie Winkie, Panda and Attaque (photo Guy Gurney)

Light airs in the first race, with Woolly Jumper, Victory, Almagores and Scaramouche (photo Phil Uhl)

The crew of Canada's Pachena endure the light airs of the first day (photo Phil Uhl)

Bermuda's Caiman II, winner of the first race, runs aground and the crew scramble aloft to try to help the yacht break free (photo Guy Gurney)

Ireland's Woolly Jumper in light airs, likely during the first race (photo Phil Uhl)

The second race saw more favourable breezes - here the fleet sets off with (left to right, Wee Willie Winkie, Moonduster, Stars & Stripes, Ragamuffin, Intuition, Hurrycane,Victory and Mandrake), photo Guy Gurney

Stars & Stripes leads a group of boats on a reaching leg during Race 2 (photo Guy Gurney)

Ireland's Regardless tacks behind France's Tahiti during the 1981 Admiral's Cup (photo Phil Uhl)

Dragon, a Dubois-39 footer, was the small boat of the British team, and found her legs in the offshore races (photo Phil Uhl)

The start of the Channel Race, with Hong Kong's La Pantera to windward of France's Tahiti and Italy's Almagores (photo Phil Uhl)

Light air downwind sailing, possibly during the start of the Channel Race, with (left to right) Accanito, Hurrycane, Moonduster, Runaway, Caiman and Ra Carat (photo Guy Gurney)

The start of the Channel Race, with Midnight Sun to leeward of Runaway and Accanito (photo Phil Uhl)

Pinta at the start of the Channel Race (photo Phil Uhl)

Runaway seen here again after the start of the Channel Race, with Flirt of Paget just ahead, and Container visible to the right (photo Phil Uhl)

Italy's Almagores is sandwiched in a pileup of Admiral's Cuppers with other yachts at a turning mark during the Channel Race (photo Guy Gurney)

Another view of Britain's Dragon (photo Guy Gurney)

 

More photographs from the 1981 Admiral's Cup can be seen here from Day 1 and Day 2 of the series.

Article published August 2026 

SORC 1981

The 1981 edition of the United States' SORC series was generally considered as a great success, but was subsequently clouded by questions raised over the ratings of several of the best performing yachts. This issue took on even more significance than usual, because the regatta doubled as the US selection series for that year’s Admiral’s Cup.

Louisiana Crude and Intuition seen here at the start of the Ocean Triangle Race in the 1981 SORC, with Wildflower to the right (photo Phil Uhl)

One of the stars of the regatta was the new Kialoa IV, the new Ron Holland design which dominated all other yachts in the Class A division. She was built in high-tech material (Kevlar, carbon fibre and unidirectional glass fibre), which provided maximum rigidity that put her out on the edge of the technological evolution of racing yachts at the time. At the other end of the technological spectrum was Pat Malloy’s Peterson 42 Intuition, which would eventually be declared the overall winner of the series (after initially finishing fourth). She was constructed in aluminium, but rivetted and glued rather than welded, which allowed significant weight savings as this allowed lighter plating as there was no loss of form or strength through welding, and less use of fairing putty. The robustness of this construction technique was proved in the second race (St Petersburg to Fort Lauderdale) when she not only survived a collision with Shockwave (a Davidson 46-footer), resulting in a damaged stem, but went on to finish second in class and fifth overall.

Intuition in breezy reaching conditions during the 1981 SORC (photo Guy Gurney)

Two predictably fast entries were the New Orleans yachts Acadia and Louisiana Crude. Acadia, a Frers 39-footer built as a one-off by New Orleans Marine. She rated 29.9ft IOR and even before the regatta began there were some reservations expressed about the accuracy of that figure. 

Acadia racing during the 1981 SORC (photo Tor Maverstaard | Seahorse)

Louisiana Crude was the latest version of Doug Peterson’s Design 33 (first seen as the Dutch 1979 Admiral’s Cup entrant Schuttevaer). Another near sister was Love Machine, and the design later reappeared as the stock-built Serendipity 43 (the most famous of which was Scarlett O’Hara). The Peterson design had returned to the SORC in 1980 as the earlier Acadia which won the event and which went on to help win the Sardinia Cup that year for the US. Louisiana Crude, owned by Tom Dreyfus and Dick Jennings, and skippered by Tom Blackaller, was the new high-tech version, built in uni-directional glass and carbon fibre, and a rating of 32.6ft.

Louisiana Crude in light air downwind conditions during the 1981 SORC

Louisiana Crude had a Class C finish record of 1/1/2/4/2/1 and took out overall fleet honours with results that were never out of the top ten, even though she was also never higher than third. It did not seem to matter whether the contest was a big boat benefit, such as the Boca Grande, or a small boat race like Ft Lauderdale, Louisiana Crude always managed to get home in good time, while Acadia faltered in both the Boca Grande and Lipton Cup races. In explaining their success with a conservative and three-year old design, Blackaller said, "When they get their kind of conditions, specialised boats win races, but when they don't, they are apt to lose big. A boat like Crude can win the series without winning a race". Dreyfus quipped, "Crude is plain, straight vanilla. A simple boat sailed by simple people".

Louisiana Crude, 1981 SORC

During the big-boat races Seymour Sinett’s latest Williwaw (the fourth of that line), a Peterson 48-footer with a rating of 37.1ft, skippered by Dennis Conner, finished first in Class B and third overall. Observers continued to wonder at the ability of Acadia and Williwaw to sail so far above their ratings when conditions were right for them.

Williwaw in fresh conditions off Miami during the 1981 SORC (photo Phil Uhl)

Before the series was over Bill Martin, the owner of Stars & Stripes, a Nelson 39-footer, protested Acadia’s rating. At the same time, the crew of Intuition felt that they were seeing a very different Williwaw being measured to the one they had been racing against, and appeared to be floating on a different set of lines, and Malloy filed a protest against her rating. The US Admiral’s Cup Team Selection Committee subsequently undertook some basic freeboard measurements of the top contenders in Nassau. Neither Acadia or Williwaw were close to the numbers on their rating certificates, and suddenly a protest that was pending on Acadia began to look serious. Despite this, Acadia, Scaramouche (a Frers 45-footer that finished fourth in Class B) and Williwaw were announced as the US Admiral’s Cup team, with Stars & Stripes named as an alternate member.

Scaramouche - seen here astern of the smaller Louisiana Crude (photo Phil Uhl)

Once the team yachts were back in Ft Lauderdale in Florida, they were remeasured in order to avoid any potential rating difficulties in England. The results were described as nothing short of shocking, with Acadia jumping from 29.9 to 31.1ft, and Williwaw from 37.1 to 38.1ft. The issue was further complicated when it was revealed that Williwaw had been measured twice in 1977, and had gone down one full foot in rating, with only the freeboard measurement changing. It was plain that over two tons of lead would have been necessary for the 3.5” measurement difference at her bow, and she measured as less stable that she actually was, by about 5%. Acadia floated higher than her measurement certificate had attested, and thus approximately a ton lighter while racing, and was also more stable than her certificate showed.

A haul-out area in Florida (Snead Island), with Midnight Sun and Aries to the left, and Infinity (in slings) and Leading Lady (photo Paul Mello)

The method employed was that both yachts were alleged to have been fitted with extra-large water tanks to sink the boats during measurement so that they could claim an IOR Mk IIIA credit, which had been devised ostensibly to benefit older, deeper-gutted yachts.

The Holland-designed fractionally-rigged Aries finished in sixth place overall - note the very coarse mainsheet purchase arrangement (photo Phil Uhl)

Scaramouche increased by 0.4ft (from 34.1ft) due to a discrepancy in her original stability data, while Intuition and Stars & Stripes increased by just 0.1ft, and within tolerances.

Intuition, 1981 SORC (photo Phil Uhl)

While all this was going on, Dreyfus and Jennings announced that Louisiana Crude had been sold to Victor Forss of Sweden. Forss also owned the older Acadia (renamed Bla Carat) which had raced in the SORC (Class B), and Louisiana Crude became Ra Carat (meaning ‘Rough Diamond’). Later, and while the boat was out of the water being repainted and prepared for shipping to Sweden, one of the USYRU measurers noticed that bumps on her hull looked a little extreme. On further inspection they were confirmed to be of too small a radius to be accepted without penalty (IOR rule 326.2). A comment from Dreyfus to a USYRU official about the measurement and number of sails on board revealed that 11 sails had been included during measurement, rather than the eight allowed (thereby affecting flotation). With that, and despite no protest being made about her rating during the SORC, the USYRU declared in late March 1981 that Louisiana Crude’s certificate was invalid, and that news was passed on to the SORC committee. Notably, however, no hearing was held to determine the exact nature of the infractions that cost her the title of SORC fleet champion.

Infinity and Canada's Amazing Grace during the 1981 SORC (photo Phil Uhl)

The USYRU could not therefore provide the SORC or Dreyfus and Jennings with a valid IOR certificate. This prompted Dreyfus to label the USYRU’s actions a witch-hunt and, and both owners filed civil action proceedings in a New Orleans court, with Dreyfus seeking $5M in damages for humiliation, injury to reputation and financial impacts. The New York Times reported on 28 March 1981 that an attorney acting for one of the owners denied any irregularities. Dreyfus noted that Louisiana Crude had exactly the same hull as the 1980 winner Acadia, and questioned how it could now be illegal.

Ted Hood's One Tonner Robin, winner of the St Petersburg - Fort Lauderdale Race (and winner of two races in the 1980 series), seen here off Tampa Bay during the 1981 SORC (photo Phil Uhl)

Nevertheless, the SORC committee determined to exclude Louisiana Crude as she did not have a valid certificate and undertook rescoring of the regatta based on new ratings. As a result, the boat that had truly dominated racing in Florida became an instant non-participant. Her new owners were given until 31 May 1981 to produce a valid certificate, but she had been shipped to Sweden in April and any measurement would have to accept the changes made by Forss, including the re-fairing of the measurement bumps. The revised results therefore remained provisional.

The Frers Maxi yacht Bumblebee IV during the 1981 SORC (photo Guy Gurney)

The rescoring in Florida showed some interesting changes in the standings, but not as much as had been expected. With Louisiana Crude missing entirely, everyone moved up one place. Acadia’s new rating pushed her down to third overall, although she still won Class D. Williwaw was pushed down to sixth overall, but also remained first in Class B. These rather minor changes in standings seemed to indicate that Louisiana Crude would have needed to have had an astronomical change in her rating to move her out of first place overall.

The fleet assembled at St Petersburg Yacht Club during the 1981 SORC (photo Guy Gurney)

The US Admiral’s Cup committee decided that there was such a cloud hanging over the ratings of Acadia and Williwaw that they could not successfully represent the US, and were dropped from the Admiral’s Cup team, which was comprised instead of Intuition, Scaramouche and Stars & Stripes. One effect of this shake-up was that the US team went to Cowes with a lower rating team than the one they had initially planned.

Class B get underway at the start of the Ocean Triangle Race during the 1981 SORC, with (left to right) Amazing Grace, Gem, Williwaw and Merrythought (photo Phil Uhl)

Immigrant, a Dubois 42-footer, raced in Class C (photo Phil Uhl)

Meanwhile, the select committee of the USYRU appointed to investigate the irregularities of Acadia and Williwaw determined that the infractions by Williwaw were sufficient to ban Sinett from racing for a period of two years, from 23 July 1981. The penalty was largely based on the testimony of Harvey Ward, Sinett’s former boat-keeper, who stated that he had used a hose to fill the bilges of the yacht with water before the most questionable measurement session, an allegation that Sinett himself denied, as was his request to testify on his own behalf.

Another image from the start of Class B in the Ocean Triangle, with Bravura (second overall in Class B) sneaking in at the boat end to weather of Infinity (photo Phil Uhl)

The situation with Acadia was also contentious, and owner Burt Keenan also contemplated a civil suit against the USYRU, and instituted his own investigation and remeasurement. Two measurers in New Orleans found the yacht to be back within acceptable tolerances for a 30ft-rater, and Keenan maintained that he had been unduly maligned by USYRU officials. Nevertheless, he also incurred a ban for one year.

Class A yacht, the 50-footer Congere, with the foredeck busy with an errant spinnaker, went on to finish third in Class A (photo Phil Uhl)

Deuces Wild, skippered by Anne Gardner, finished fourth in Class E (photo Phil Uhl)

Despite all the controversy behind the SORC and the US team selection, the team went on to acquit itself well in the 1981 Admiral’s Cup, finishing in second place. The series, that started on 29 July, was won by Britain, which itself was to face its own rating controversy following the remeasurement of team yacht Victory of Burnham after she raced in the 1982 SORC. As it transpired, the lower ratings of the US team were better aligned than the original team to the conditions for the 1981 Admiral's Cup, and its second place result was led by the minimum-rater Stars & Stripes which finished in fourth place on individual points, with Intuition 11th and Scaramouche 21st. Ra Carat formed part of the ninth-placed Swedish team (of 16), sailing with a rating of 32.7ft, just 0.1ft higher than her rating for the SORC. She finished a creditable 12th on individual points, just one point behind Intuition, and scored a memorable second in Class 2 overall in the Channel Race.

The afterguard aboard Louisiana Crude during the 1981 SORC (photo Paul Mello)

Stars & Stripes, the standout performer in the US team in the 1981 Admiral's Cup, approaches a leeward mark during that series, ahead of New Zealand's Wee Willie Winkie and Canada's Runaway 

Article updated September 2026

This article is based on accounts set out in The World of Yachting 1981/82; The Official History of the Admiral’s Cup (Timothy Jeffery); Great Yacht Races (Bob Fisher); and Seahorse (May/June 1981 edition), including articles at the time by designer Bruce Kelley; the New York Times (28 March 1981) and Sports Illustrated.

The end of the IOR

I recently came across an article penned by well-known yacht designer Julian Everitt and which had been shared to the One Ton Class Facebook page. Julian has been kind enough to allow me to publish his insightful and thought-provoking article here (to which I've added a few images):

A while back David Macfarlane posed the question: “Why did the IOR die?” The answer is surprisingly simple and has little to do with economic downturns, crazy, escalating costs or the perception that the boats were unseaworthy and slow.

 Australia's Ragamuffin during the last Admiral's Cup under IOR in 1993, not long before the eventual demise of the IOR altogether 

The very people, the members of the International Technical Committee (ITC), who were tasked to protect and develop the rule for the benefit of the owners signed the death warrant some six years before the beast was finally deemed extinct. It wasn’t a deliberate act, by any means, it was just kind of allowed to happen as interests grew in the development of a new ‘super’ rule that would cure all the ‘ills’ of offshore handicapping. It was called IMS. The International Measurement System.

IMS was very much an American based initiative formulated by a burgeoning interest in the power of computers as envisioned by ‘idealists’ at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). This belief in a ‘perfect’ system filtered into the ITC who then increasingly believed that IMS could replace IOR as THE rule for Grand Prix Offshore Racing. At a stroke IMS was perceived as a handicapping system that would allow the return of ‘wholesome’ cruiser racers to the Grand Prix level.

ILC40s, as a level-rating derivative of the IMS rule, seen here competing in the 1995 Admiral's Cup

The 1976 French cat rigged Mini Tonner L'Effraie

And so the scene was set for a showdown between the two rules. Funnily enough however, this ‘conflict’ largely took place behind closed doors - the closed doors of the ITC. This erstwhile Group of designers and boffins had done a reasonable job of helping to develop the original, Olin Stephens/Dick Carter created Mk 1 IOR, into an ever more complex Mk III IOR. They had dealt with the slings and arrows of ‘cat’ rigs, unballasted daggerboards, extreme overhangs, bumps, chines and many other rule dodgers thrown at it by a vast army of new, young designers. The rule really was the ultimate mathematical, but organic and holistic challenge imaginable and so it required a lot of policing and an awful lot of tweaking.

The Farr One Ton centreboarder, Jenny H, 1977

At the annual ITC meeting always held in November and euphemistically called The November Meetings informal submissions were invited from the ‘floor’ for what would eventually become IOR Mk IV. But the minds of the powers that be were elsewhere. Despite impassioned pleas from designers including Tony Castro, Geoff Stagg, representing Bruce Farr, the Dubois office, myself and several owners to use IOR as the ‘baseline’ for producing more user friendly designs, the ITC elected to promote IMS as the rule for the future. Gary Mull, chairman of the ITC at this time, seemed to be heavily influenced by a growing love affair from American designers, like Dave Pedrick, Bill Tripp and the ‘scientist’ Jerry Milgram, with IMS. Together they envisioned a new breed of fair hulled, moderate designs, with great stability, proper cockpits and fitted out interiors.

The IOR Mk IV, proposed from the audience at the 1988 November meetings promulgated similar outcomes, but utilising the proven and robust linear formulas of IOR rather than the largely unknown reliance on unproven Velocity Predictions inherent in the IMS formula.

Turkish Delight trying to stay on her feet during the 1987 Irish Admiral's Cup trials

In the proposed revisions to IOR, stability would be unmeasured getting rid, at a stoke, of the dreaded Centre of Gravity Factor - a measurement fraught with inaccuracies and held largely responsible for producing unstable boats and ones overly dependent on crew weight on the rail. CGF was also directly responsible for such undesirable idiosyncrasies as beam waterline bumps.

Gone too would be the ubiquitous 150 percent overlap on headsails which gave unrated sail area. This change would have opened the door to the development of non-overlap rigs.

Victory (left), Hitchhiker and Pinta sporting their big no.1 genoas during the first race of the 1981 Admiral's Cup 

The accursed creases and distortions around the aft girth measurements was to be addressed also. One simple suggestion was to rule out any form of reverse inflection in the aft profile. The days of the bustle were virtually over anyway and of course all of our proposed rule changes could be easily ‘grandfathered’ to prevent the existing fleet suffering too much. In reality small changes to the aft girth stations and most particularly the girth differences between inner and outer girth stations would have produced fuller, wider and fairer sterns in short order, while maintains an element of choice. Choice being a factor missing from today’s rules.

While the outcomes of such changes cannot ever be accurately predicted, cause and effect is highly influential in a formula like IOR. The simple removal of the penalty on stability would have quickly allowed designers to create lighter boats as stability could have been found in low CG keels rather than hull form and brute overall weight. In turn lighter and more powerful boats would have pointed the way to fuller sterns.

Gunboat Rangiriri - one of the new breed of Farr-designed light displacement centreboarders of 1977, showing the relatively clean lines that were possible before the ITC forced an increase in displacement

But the ITC very systematically destroyed these arguments as unworkable and felt IMS was a much more effective way of achieving the same outcomes. In fairness to the ITC a number of designers, including Rob Humphries - a member of the ITC board at the time - had IMS designs out racing that did showcase the rule rather well. But this was to be a short lived moment.

And so the ITC policy was set at that fateful November meeting in 1988. The two rules would run in parallel while the anomalies inherent in the VPP-driven IMS were sorted out and a new era of dual purpose offshore racers would begin.

Work would continue on the development of IOR, but with none of the suggested fundamental changes implemented. A Mk IV Rule was duly drafted, but few in authority had any real enthusiasm for it. As far as they were concerned IOR was dying and IMS was the new kid on the block to be nurtured.

The Whitbread Maxi ketch Steinlager 2 

In an earlier attempt by the ITC to be more inclusive of heavier, more cruising orientated boats an IOR MK IIIA was introduced, but this backfired spectacularly when Bruce Farr, in particular, exploited the carelessly drafted rule by producing the heavier, but much longer Steinlager 2 Whitbread Maxi in 1989. This amazing own goal of a rule amendment created by the ITC finally allowed the creation of the all conquering inshore Maxi Matador2. Far from allowing the development of heavier, more fitted out boats, the Mk IIIA rule simply promoted heavier stripped out boats which in the case of the Maxi’s allowed them to effectively gain 3ft, or so, of unmeasured length. This was one of many misdirections the ITC took in trying to ‘protect’ the rule and it had a seriously deleterious effect on owner confidence.

Matador 2, the biggest and fastest of the IOR Maxis 

But back to the ITC meetings of November 1988. I remember it like yesterday, Geoff Stagg’s final reaction to the ITC intragency. “We don’t really care what you do. Just give us any rule and we’ll go off and design winners for it”.

Gaucho (above and below)

And that is precisely what happened. Within two years Farr had produced the ultimate Grand Prix IMS boat in the form of the 43ft Gaucho. But it wasn’t the beginning of the new era predicted by the rule makers of elegance and internal comfort. Gaucho signalled a very different future. Her overhangs were very short, freeboard was high, the sheer line straight and the interior just as stripped as an IOR boat except for the introduction of a door on the ‘head’ compartment. Other required features like a galley and saloon table were treated with token gestures expensively built in carbon. But much more significantly, in order for velocity predictions to work ‘accurately’, actual stability had to be measured. It wasn’t long before lead was being replaced by wood at the bottom of keels. Not exactly the promised land of wholesome cruiser racers envisioned by the rule makers.

But while IMS continued to be promoted as the solution to ‘fair’ global offshore yacht racing IOR struggled on, shouldering virtually all of the blame for declining racing fleets.

I remember talking to Olin (Stephens) about it all. He was very sanguine - perhaps even a little surprised by the way IOR had developed, but ever the enthusiast for a mathematical solution he liked the theories behind IMS and perhaps felt that the apparent shortcomings in the IOR could be addressed more effectively by the overarching qualities of IMS. It was a mathematically-based theory that wasn’t born out in practice.

With the advantage of a 21st century perspective and taking into account yacht racing developments since the death of IOR in 1994, would keeping IOR been better for the sport as a whole? In terms of continuity and preventing the explosion of multiple, fleet sapping alternative classes, it would assuredly have been beneficial. But it did need a major shot in the arm at the end of the 1980s to reassure an ever more cynical owner base that their worries were being addressed.

Cookson's High 5 followed the Gaucho theme and was dominant in the 2000 Kenwood Cup 

In the rarefied atmosphere of Whitbread sponsored global racing, Bruce Farr, once again, showed the way. As IOR lay on its deathbed - an outcome accelerated by clumsy attempts to update events like the Admiral’s Cup with the proposed introduction of one designs and IMS handicapping - Farr, in tandem with the foresight of the Whitbread race committee who allowed asymmetric spinnakers to be flown, discarded the ‘heavy’ design route he had produced with Steinlager 2 and produced a new Maxi design that was some 7,500kgs lighter. This much lighter design was a great deal quicker around the world and potentially showed a new beginning for lightweight IOR racers. Sadly, however, these three Farr ketches, La Poste, Merit Cup and New Zealand Endeavour, were one of the last throws of the dice for IOR.

New Zealand Endeavour - one of three new Farr-designed Whitbread Maxi ketches for the 1993-94 race 

But back to theorising about where IOR could have led in design terms. Would keeping a highly modified version of the rule kept ocean racing on its feet? Would it have prevented the almost total demise of classic events like the Ton Cups, the Admiral’s Cup, the Kenwood, the Southern Cross, the Onion Patch, the SORC? Who knows? Maybe it was all about economics or personal time management, but what I do know is that the defining legacy of IOR was its success at global continuity in offshore racing. To have made the decision to ditch this in favour of a hugely more flawed IMS was a grave mistake.

Would a boat designed to an updated version of IOR as suggested back in 1988 at the ITC meetings evolved into something equivalent to today’s high performance designs as typified by the IRC racers, TP52’s and Fast 40’s? Yes. Is the simple answer. Advances in lightweight construction, appendage design, carbon spars would have all contributed hugely, but the biggest single factor effecting overall design and concept would have been the removal of attempting to measure stability. Just as is the case today, boats would not have become more stable, but would simply have become significantly lighter and capable of carrying larger rigs effectively. These are the primary elements driving the performance in today’s designs.

To have arrived at this point in the genesis of the offshore yacht within the IOR style framework would have resulted in far more fleet continuity across the globe and possibly allowed the major offshore championships to survive the various financial challenges and rule uncertainties that killed them off.

Julian's article concludes with the above image of his 43 footer Backlash, with the caption "It's not easy to pick a single picture that represents the entire IOR era from 1970 to 1994, but this comes from a high point of the rule in 1985. Fleets were huge and there was enormous variety of design from a multitude of designers".

Article dated August 2019